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may be sued at the domicile of one, yet no annotations are given
of certain important qualifications.1 5
On the whole this revised edition of the Code of Practice is a
decided improvement over the 1932 edition by the publisher and
will be of great value to the bench and bar. The author and publisher have added a very valuable book to their very serviceable
set.
BEN R. MILLER*

THE TORT LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERs,

by Leon Thomas David.

Public Administration Service, Publisher, Chicago, 1940. Pp.
vi, 93.
The focus of Mr. David's booklet is the tort liability of officers
and employees of municipal corporations in California although
some attention is given other classes of public "officers" and comparative materials." He pretty well gets over the conventional
categories in terms of the California decisions and statutes. Generalizations that sweep over state lines are none too reliable in
such matters. Mr. David's prime concern with his own bailiwick
renders his work much more pointed and at the same time provides us an expository monograph of comparative value in other
jurisdictions.
Our author's first concern is to endoctrinate his readers with
certain "fundamental concepts." He adverts at this stage to sovereign immunity from tort liability but in a rather meagre fashion. More attention is given the business of defining "office" and
"officer" and distinguishing officers from employees.
Respondeat superior does not apply as between superior and
subordinate municipal officers, we are told, because both are instruments of the sovereign and stand on an equal plane as "servants of the law." More plainly put, this is to say that the business
being conducted is not that of the superior, but of the public, and
the organized public, not he, should bear the risk where he is not
personally at fault.
The discussion of the liability of officers acting under unconstitutional statutes is to be tempered now by reference to the im15. Alpha v. Rose, 171 La. 753, 132 So. 222 (1931); Gordon v. Bates-Crumley Chevrolet Co., 182 La. 795, 162 So. 624 (1935).
* Member, Baton Rouge Bar.
1. The materials upon which Mr. David's monograph is based are to be
found in a series of articles by him which first appeared in the Southern
California Law Review.
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portant inroads the Supreme Court has recently made, in the
Chicot County case,2 upon the old doctrine of nullity ab initio
grounded upon the extravagant language of Mr. Justice Field in
Norton v. Shelby County.3 Surely, the relativity of constitutional
questions, so emphatically punctuated in recent Supreme Court
adjudication, should bespeak protection for the officer with respect to acts prior to declaration of unconstitutionality. Even
thereafter, if he was not a party to the case, should he not be
protected unless he had actual4 notice of the decision or notice be
reasonably imputable to him?
The liability of officers with legislative or judicial powers and
duties is treated at some length along conventional lines under
the broad head of discretionary powers and duties. A section on
legislative fact-finding embodies a none-too-effectual effort to define the legislative process in contradistinction to the judicial process. We are told that "legislative fact-finding, therefore, does not
partake of the judicial, in that it is concerned with rules rather
than the determination of individual application of facts to rules;'
in that it does not determine the rule in order to decide between
disputants; in that the rule is general." This brushes lightly over
the important realities of sub-legislation ordained by administrative agencies. Consider, for example, the function of the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards Act. By
authority of that act he may fix a schedule of rates governing the
rates of market agencies serving particular stockyards. In such a
case the Secretary's concern is not with broad general rules; his
business is to consider a particular economic situation in its relation to the public interest and to make a determination as to rules
which is not, in scope and in its effect upon the parties concerned,
greatly unlike a judgment.
Under the head of quasi-judicial functions Mr. David deals
with the tort liability of administrative officers. He very appropriately observes that where the attack is upon the exercise of
judgment or discretion by administrative officers the tort litigation would involve review by a jury of determinations of those
officers, which might amount to a substitution of the judgment of
the jurors for that of the administrative officers. Certainly it
2. Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371,
60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940).
& 118 U.S. 425, 6 S.Ct. 1121, 30 L.Ed. 178 (1886).
4. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme. Court for the 1940-1941 Term
-- Symposium (1942) 4 LOUISUANA LAW REviEw 165, 215, 222-223.
5. Doubtless it was intended here to refer to the application of rules to
facts, not the converse.
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seems incongruous that such a procedure should be permitted
where the administrative officers have been given a discretion
in the premises because of their expertise.0
In connection with the non-discretionary functions and duties
of public officers case materials are collected by the author from
police, health and other fields of administration which give practical content to the discussion.
A chapter is devoted to a discussion of California legislation
governing the duties and liabilities of officers having charge of
streets, buildings, and other public works. While the effect of this
legislation appears somewhat to limit official liability it can hardly
be regarded as very advanced legislation in the field. This reviewer believes that Mr. David would concur in the conclusion
that there should be a frontal attack upon the old notion of governmental immunity in tort and a thoroughgoing extension of
government, as distinguished from official, responsibility for injuries to persons and property arising out of the conduct of public
business." As a concomitant of the assault upon the immunity it
would appear to this reviewer that a correspondingly drastic limitation of the personal liability of public officers should be made.
The notion that such personal liability is a wholesome stimulant
toward official rectitude belongs more to a relatively simple preIndustrial-Revolution society than to our present complex situation in which public administration is an enormous business, in
the conduct of which the responsible officials administer laws and
effectuate legislative policy through great organizations rather
than by direct action.
For the benefit of lay readers the author has appended a glossary in which legal terminology used in his study is defined.
JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM*
6. See Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers (1937) 21 Minn.
L. Rev. 263, 308-310.
7. The reviewer has recently had his say on this subject. See Fordham
and Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in Tort in Louisiana (1941) 4
LOUISIANA LAW

REViEW 720.

*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

